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the Minor League 
Reserve System
Abstract
Minor League Baseball is a half-billion dollar a year 
industry in the United States. It has grown to its 
current state under an umbrella of protection from 
U.S. antitrust statutes. Beginning with the Federal 
Baseball decision in 1922, the Supreme Court has 
consistently ruled that professional baseball is 
exempt from both the Sherman and Clayton Acts—
the seminal federal government statutes regarding 
antitrust. This status is unique; no other professional 
sport enjoys such immunity. If the exemption were 
lost, the effects on this staple of American culture 
would likely be extremely disruptive. Throughout 
this project, I analyzed the effects that a change in 
the application of federal antitrust law would have on 
two aspects of the game: 1) the player development 
agreements between the major league franchises 
and their minor league affiliates, and 2) the standard 
player contracts signed by every minor league player, 
which bind them to the team that drafted them until 
well after they make it to the major leagues. After 
finding that a change in the way the courts interpret 
past decisions would prevent both of these aspects 
from operating the way they have in the past due 
to concerns over their anticompetitive effects, I 
consider the likelihood that these changes would 
actually be made. The court system’s reluctance 
to violate precedent; the effect of the antitrust 
“rule of reason,” which allows for some anti-
competitive activity provided that the actions yield 
even greater “pro-competitive benefits;” and the 
antitrust exemptions provided specifically for labor 
agreements arranged through collective bargaining 
are all considered during the process of finding that 
Minor League Baseball is most likely secure in its 
desire to remain unimpacted by federal antitrust law. 
While previous discussions have focused solely on 
the major leagues, this study builds on their work 
to look at the effects the antitrust laws have on the 
minor league game.
I
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Introduction
Antitrust law and baseball are intertwined in such a way 
that they may never be completely separated. Ever since 
the Federal Baseball decision in 1922, baseball has been 
exempt from the governance of federal antitrust law. 
Although its effect on the player-owner relationship in 
the major leagues is barely felt today, the exemption’s 
power still holds strong in the minor leagues, where 
players work at their craft under an antiquated reserve 
system that stifles their ability to earn what they are 
truly worth. Ironically, it is that very reserve system that 
allows the minor leagues to exist. This discussion will 
cover several relevant points of interest to this topic, 
including the genesis of the antitrust laws; the creation 
of baseball’s exemption to those laws; the players’ 
struggle to skirt that exemption; and, finally, the piece 
will settle on a discussion of what this situation means 
to the minor league franchises and cities that thrive on 
baseball’s lower ranks.
Antitrust Law and Sports
The legislators of the late nineteenth century were 
concerned with business concentration; the acquisition 
of monopoly power by American companies; subsequent 
wealth transfers from consumers to monopolists; and 
the ever-present links between economic and political 
power. In an effort to respond to these populist concerns, 
encouraging competition and lowering prices for 
consumers in the process, Congress passed the Sherman 
Antitrust Act in 1890 (Sullivan and Harrison, 2003, p. 
3). Section One of the Act states: 
 Every contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every 
person who shall make any contract or engage 
in any combination or conspiracy hereby 
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of 
a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be 
punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if 
a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, 
or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, 
or by both said punishments, in the discretion 
of the court. (15 U.S.C. §1)
Section Two of the Act similarly provides:
 Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt 
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with 
any other person or persons, to monopolize 
any part of the trade or commerce among 
the several States, or with foreign nations, 
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on 
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine 
not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, 
or, if any other person, $350,000, or by 
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by 
both said punishments, in the discretion of the 
court. (15 U.S.C. §2)
These two sections make up the primary provisions 
of the Sherman Act, which spans seven sections. Sections 
One and Two create a sort of dichotomy, whereby 
defendants are usually only reasonably eligible to be 
prosecuted under one rule or the other, although it is 
quite common for a plaintiff to allege violations of both 
sections as a legal strategy. This application of the law 
rises from the idea that it would be impossible for a firm 
to “combine” with itself and thus violate Section One. 
Therefore, although it is possible for a single entity to 
violate the Sherman Act’s first section by restraining 
trade through a monopoly, single entities are normally 
liable under the first section only if there is a strong case 
against the firm in question under Section Two, which 
forbids monopolization of an industry. Similarly, it would 
be difficult to prosecute multiple firms under Section 
Two, because a monopoly, by definition, involves only 
one firm providing a product or service. Of course, there 
are exceptions to this rule as well, as “shared monopoly” 
theories exist. However, in general, plaintiffs alleging 
actions by two or more firms conspiring in restraint 
of trade would be advised to bring complaints under 
Section One.
Sports leagues are typically prosecuted under 
Section One, and so a league will commonly claim to be 
a single entity in defense of its actions. Prosecution of a 
league under Section Two, while possible, is difficult. It 
must not only be shown that the league has monopoly 
power, but that it also has undergone efforts other than 
market competition to achieve or maintain this power. 
(Sullivan and Harrison, 2003, p. 299)
Assuming that a league is not a single entity, there 
is still another hurdle for potential plaintiffs to scale. 
Antitrust court decisions fall into one of two categories: 
“per se” violations are actions that violate the antitrust 
laws so directly that it is very unlikely that any legal 
justification can be given; “rule of reason” violations, on 
the other hand, must be shown to have anti-competitive 
effects that are so great that they outweigh any pro-
competitive benefits the agreement in question provides. 
Since the Supreme Court decision in National Collegiate 
Athletic Association v. Board of Regents (1984), in which 
the NCAA (the National Collegiate Athletic Association) 
was sued by The Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia 
for its restrictive football television contracts, sports 
leagues have been evaluated under the “rule of reason” 
doctrine. This decision has automatically added an extra 
layer to any antitrust proceeding involving a sports 
r y a n  m a B r ya n t i t r u s t  l a W  a n d  t h e  m i n o r  l e a g u e  r e s e r V e  s y s t e m
T h E  U n I v E r S I T y  O f  K E n T U C K y  J O U r n A L  O f  U n D E r g r A D U AT E  S C h O L A r S h I P   
league. The Court explained its decision to move to a “rule of reason” 
approach by acknowledging that some restraints on competition are 
necessary for sports leagues to exist (468 U.S. 85 at 103).
Another prominent antitrust statute that has importance to the operation 
of sports leagues is the Clayton Antitrust Act. It was passed in 1914, and 
was meant to close perceived gaps in the Sherman Act. Additionally, the 
legislature was not pleased with the construction of the “rule of reason,” 
which was crafted in the court system. Many parts of the Act, which spans 
sixteen sections, have few applications to sports, and are rarely if ever seen 
in sports antitrust trials. However, Section Six of the Act has produced an 
important consideration for negotiations with a union:
 The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of 
commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be 
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, 
or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual 
help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to 
forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from 
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such 
organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be 
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the 
antitrust laws. (15 U.S.C. §17)
This section was crafted in response to some court decisions in 
which labor unions were found to be in violation of the Sherman Act. 
(Kaiser, 2004, p. 239) The language here essentially allows labor unions 
to exist, exempting them from antitrust legislation. This is known as the 
“statutory” labor exemption. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has adopted 
a “nonstatutory” exemption for labor regarding the results of the process 
of collective bargaining. Out of deference to the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA), courts have held that terms agreed upon during collective 
bargaining are exempt from antitrust law, no matter how uncompetitive 
the terms are. (Kaiser, 2004, p. 240)
The antitrust laws described to this point have caused sports leagues in 
the United States some problems in the past. As was mentioned above, a pair 
of universities successfully sued the NCAA under federal antitrust law for 
forcing its member institutions to enter into television contracts that limited 
their potential exposure and revenue in order to give other institutions an 
equal amount of attention. In the professional arena, the NFL (the National 
Football League) was forced to allow the Oakland Raiders to move to Los 
Angeles in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football 
League (1984). Many other antitrust actions have been taken with varying 
results. However, professional baseball is exempt from nearly all antitrust 
suits. This exemption stems from a decision that was handed down by 
the Supreme Court in 1922: Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National 
League (1922).
Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption
In the Federal Baseball case, a team from Baltimore that was a member of 
the Federal League sued the major leagues. The Federal League was the 
last legitimate rival to the National and American Leagues at that time. The 
Baltimore Terrapins claimed that the major leagues had conspired to prevent 
Baltimore from becoming a viable franchise by denying them access to major 
league players with the reserve system, which bound players indefinitely to 
the franchises that had signed them originally.
Initially, the Supreme Court of the District of 
Columbia ruled in favor of the plaintiff for damages 
of $80,000, which were trebled under Section Four of 
the Clayton Act. (15 U.S.C. §15) However, the Court of 
Appeals of the District of Columbia reversed the decision 
on the major leagues’ appeal, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court unanimously affirmed the reversal. Associate 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote the opinion 
for the Court and memorably proclaimed:
 The business is giving exhibitions of base 
ball, which are purely state affairs. It is true 
that, in order to attain for these exhibitions 
the great popularity that they have achieved, 
competitions must be arranged between clubs 
from different cities and States. But the fact 
that in order to give the exhibitions the Leagues 
must induce free persons to cross state lines 
and must arrange and pay for their doing so 
is not enough to change the character of the 
business. (259 U.S. 200 at 208)
Justice Holmes was addressing one of the primary 
requirements for a federal antitrust violation, that is, 
the defendant must have been involved in interstate 
commerce for prosecution under federal law. Having 
found that baseball did not involve interstate commerce, 
Holmes rationalized that Baltimore’s antitrust claim 
could go no further. This decision, however, did not 
simply prevent the Baltimore club from receiving 
damages. It effectively exempted professional baseball 
from federal antitrust statutes altogether.
Thirty-one years later, George Toolson tested 
baseball’s exemption in Toolson v. New York Yankees 
(1953). Toolson was a player in the Yankees’ farm 
system. When the Yankees attempted to demote him 
from his position with Newark of the International 
League to a team in Binghamton of the Eastern League, 
he refused to report. The Yankees “blacklisted” him, 
effectively ending his baseball career, and Toolson 
brought action against the team in protest of the reserve 
system.
In a one paragraph opinion, the Court reaffirmed by 
a 7-2 margin the existence of baseball’s exemption, and 
explained that Congress had done nothing to attempt to 
alter the decision in Federal Baseball; baseball had been 
permitted to develop since the Federal Baseball decision 
with the understanding that it was exempt from federal 
antitrust law; and legislation should be the means by 
which this exemption is overturned in order to follow the 
doctrine of stare decisis, under which it is necessary for 
a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same 
points arise again in litigation (346 U.S. 356 at 357).
In 1972, the Supreme Court heard an argument 
against the reserve system and the antitrust exemption 
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for the final time in Flood v. Kuhn (1972). Curt Flood 
was a center fielder for the St. Louis Cardinals. In 
1969, he was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies, a 
move which he opposed. He petitioned Bowie Kuhn, 
baseball’s commissioner at the time, for free agency, 
but was rejected. In response, he brought suit against 
the commissioner.
This scenario was similar to the one presented in 
Toolson in many ways, and predictably, a verdict similar 
to the one given in Toolson was delivered. Associate 
Justice Harry Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court, 
which decided by a 5-3 margin. In his opinion, Justice 
Blackmun acknowledged that baseball’s exemption was 
unique, but refused to overturn Federal Baseball for the 
same reasons mentioned in Toolson. He repeated the 
Toolson Court’s demand that Congress make any changes 
in the application of this precedent.
Considering the weight of precedent in the court 
system’s decision-making process, baseball’s exemption 
seemed almost impenetrable. The reserve system looked 
like an immovable establishment. However, by 1968, the 
seeds had already been planted for the end of baseball’s 
reserve system in the major leagues.
The End of the Major League 
Reserve System
The Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) 
had been the players’ formal bargaining representative 
since 1954, but the players had not taken the initiative 
of negotiating a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) 
under the National Labor Relations Act until 1968. The 
first CBA was simple, and essentially maintained the 
status quo, but it was important because it established a 
dialogue between the MLBPA and baseball’s owners.
In 1970, the players and owners established an 
arbitration panel with a mutually selected chairman. 
The panel would resolve disputes between the two 
sides involving any subject besides “the integrity of 
baseball,” which remained under the commissioner’s 
discretion. Three years later, at the expiration of the 1970 
agreement, the players asked the owners for free agency. 
After a bargaining session, the owners agreed to allow 
players with two full seasons of major league experience 
to have their salaries determined by an arbitrator. The 
agreement also contained language that gave players 
who had played in the league for at least ten years, the 
last five of which having been with the same team, the 
right to veto any trade involving himself (Major League 
Rule 9(e)). If this agreement had been made four years 
earlier, Curt Flood would have had the right to choose 
to stay with the Cardinals.
Finally, at the conclusion of the 1975 season, the 
MLBPA was able to end the reserve system in the major 
leagues just three years after the Flood decision. Two 
players, Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally, refused 
to sign their standard contracts. They took their cases 
to arbitrator Peter Seitz, whose role had been written 
into the previous CBA. Seitz determined that the reserve 
clause did not constitute an indefinite right of renewal, 
but rather entailed a one-year team option — in other 
words, the clause only gave the team the ability to 
renew the player’s contract for one year after the first 
contract was signed. Essentially, the players had been 
granted free agency.
The owners attempted a lockout in response, but 
Commissioner Kuhn ordered the spring training camps to 
open to begin the 1976 season. A new CBA was reached 
during the summer, and free agency was officially 
written into the agreement. The players accepted a 
few owner-proposed restrictions that delayed true free-
agency for several years after a player’s big-league career 
had begun, but the major league reserve system was 
weakened beyond the point of recognition.
Additionally, in 1998 Congress passed the Curt Flood 
Act. The Act proclaimed that baseball’s exemption from 
antitrust law as it concerned the relationship between 
players and management had been repealed (15 U.S.C. 
§26b). Occurring forty-five years after the Toolson Court 
had made its initial plea for a Congressional ruling, the 
Act amounted to little more than political posturing. 
It came in the wake of the struggle that characterized 
the relationship between the players and the owners 
in the 1990s, which saw a player strike that resulted 
in the cancellation of a World Series. Now that the 
players and owners negotiate by means of CBAs, federal 
antitrust law has little, if any, effect on the discussion. 
The nonstatutory labor exemption exempts the owners 
from prosecution for any anticompetitive measures they 
might choose to take, and the players have no need to 
use antitrust to get their way; the NLRA allows them 
all the bargaining weapons they require (Kaiser, 2004, 
p. 230).
It may have taken a century of work and negotiation, 
but the reserve system has been put to rest in the 
major leagues. However, its legacy lives on in another 
form: Minor League Baseball, without the benefit of a 
players’ union, has maintained a reserve system since 
its establishment.
The Minor Leagues
Minor League Baseball (MiLB) is a collection of twenty 
professional baseball leagues comprised of the affiliates 
of Major League Baseball (MLB) teams. These teams and 
leagues are independently owned, but operate in concert 
with MLB; this is most prominently demonstrated by the 
fact that the contracts of the players on each team are 
owned by the major league team with which the minor 
league franchise is affiliated. The minor leagues consist 
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of several distinct levels, namely Class AAA, Class AA, Class A, Short-
Season A, and Rookie. Class A is further subdivided into Short Season 
Class A, Full Season Class A, and Class A-Advanced; Rookie leagues are 
also sub-classified as Rookie or Rookie-Advanced (National Association 
Agreement, Section 10.02(d)). Players are drafted and/or signed out of 
high school, college, or foreign countries by a major league team and 
assigned to a low-level minor league team. As their skills improve and 
they gain more experience, they are transferred to a team on a higher 
level, with the eventual goal of getting to AAA, and then to the major 
leagues.
The relationship between MLB and MiLB is governed by an 
umbrella contract called the Professional Baseball Agreement (PBA). 
It is re-negotiated every seven to ten years (the current PBA was made 
effective on October 1, 2004, and runs through September 30, 2014), 
and includes a provision allowing the agreement to be terminated in 
the event of a work stoppage or a change in the application of antitrust 
law to professional baseball (Professional Baseball Agreement, Article 
III (A) (1-4)). MLB and MiLB have negotiated PBAs since 1992. The 
PBA provides stability to the minor leagues, because the relationship 
between MLB and MiLB was only loosely organized before 1992 (Stein 
Interview). Among the issues governed by the agreement are: a provision 
for a percentage of MiLB’s ticket revenue to be paid to MLB (5.5% 
in 2007, set to escalate to 7.0% by 2011); a requirement that a minor 
league team should vacate a territory in return for fair compensation if a 
major league team should move into said territory; allowances for MLB 
to conduct marketing campaigns in minor league stadiums and have 
access to all telecast feeds of minor league games; and, most pertinent 
to this discussion, the assurance that the MLB teams will maintain a 
Player Development Contract (PDC) with each of at least 160 minor 
league teams each season. 
The standard PDC is contained in Rule 56 of the Major League 
Rules, which are negotiated between MLB, MiLB, and the MLBPA. The 
PDC is not permitted to be changed, and a maximum $500,000 fine is 
written into the agreement as a deterrent to any team attempting to 
modify or add to the PDC (Major League Rule 56(a)). PDC agreements 
are made between a minor league and a major league club, are only 
permitted to be made for either two or four year periods, and terminate 
automatically if a new PBA is negotiated (Major League Rule 56(c)). The 
PDC divides all the expenses associated with the operation of a minor 
league franchise between the major league and minor league clubs, from 
travel expenses all the way down to the bats and balls used on the field, 
and even includes provisions for items such as telephone service to the 
field manager’s office in each clubhouse. While salaries for players, 
coaches, and trainers; some equipment expenses; and hotel rooms are 
paid for by the big league club, the minor league team is responsible 
for most of the day-to-day expenses associated with the operation of 
the team. In addition, Major League Rule 58 establishes minimum 
facility standards for minor league venues. This rule governs everything 
contained in a stadium, from the number of seats for spectators down 
to the brightness of the lights shining on the field (Major League Rule 
Attachment 58).
The minor league franchise has no control over what players, 
coaches, and trainers are assigned to it by the major league team with 
which it is associated. Players are commonly promoted or demoted 
one or more levels by the major league management. 
Often, a change in affiliation at the expiration of a PDC 
is not initiated by the major league club, but instead 
by a minor league club whose ownership feels it is 
not being provided enough talented players by the 
major league club to be a successful attendance draw 
(Stein Interview).
The minor leagues are a great asset to Major 
League Baseball. They are not only a place where 
many major league stars are developed, but also 
generate fan interest; supply a pool of readily available 
players when current major leaguers become injured 
or lose effectiveness; provide a place for major 
league players to rehabilitate from injury; and corner 
the market on nearly all available talent, making it 
essentially impossible for a rival league to form. Of 
course, there are other well-established barriers to 
entry for a potential rival league, including a lack of 
available baseball markets and the inability to attract 
media coverage.
A major league franchise will commonly have six 
or more minor league affiliates, four of which (Full 
Season Class A and above) play 140-game seasons 
beginning in April and ending in September. These 
minor leagues resemble the operation of the major 
leagues in many ways, with teams traveling from 
one member town to another to play three-to-four 
game series before moving on to another town or 
returning home to host a series. The leagues come 
complete with an all-star showcase at the season’s 
midway point, and hold playoffs in September, when 
the major leagues are conducting the final month of 
their season (Major League Rule 32(b)).
The teams that do not play full seasons begin play in 
late June, after the annual First-Year Player Draft. These 
leagues represent the lower levels of the minor leagues, 
and are typically stocked with players who have been 
acquired recently by the major league franchises out of 
high school or college.
Every player who is drafted must sign a Minor 
League Uniform Player Contract (MLUPC) in order to 
play in the minor leagues. The body of this contract 
is written in “eight point fine print and is divided into 
twenty-seven paragraphs covering subjects such as 
parties to the contract, schedule of payments, loyalty, 
dispute resolution, termination, governing state law, 
and pictures of players.” (Crownover, 1995, p. 228) This 
portion of the contract is not permitted to be changed. 
Another part of the contract allows for a signing bonus 
and other considerations. The minimum monthly pay 
schedule is strict and amounts to barely more than 
minimum wage for the players at the lowest levels. 
While baseball claims that player salaries are “open to 
negotiation,” a player has no leverage with which to 
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negotiate. His choices are limited to taking the salary 
offered by his team, or leaving baseball. As a player 
progresses through the minors, minimum monthly pay 
increases, but it never approaches the major league 
minimum salaries that have been collectively bargained 
through the MLBPA. The minimum for a player in 
Class AAA is $2,150 per month, which amounts to 
less than $10,000 per year in what is essentially a four 
and one-half month season (“General Minor League 
Information”). In contrast, the current major league 
minimum salary is $380,000 per year (2007-2011 Basic 
Agreement, Article VI.(B)).
The same reserve system that the major league 
players worked so hard to abolish is still at work in the 
minor leagues. Included in the MLUPC is a provision 
that allows the major league franchise to renew the 
contract with the player under the same terms for seven 
separate seasons including the one during which the 
contract was signed (Major League Rule Attachment 
3 (VI.) (A.)).
If a player reaches the major leagues, the MLUPC 
is replaced with a major league contract, but the player 
can still be sent back to the minor leagues during a 
maximum of three separate seasons without the team 
having to fear the player’s acquisition by another team. 
Once a player has accumulated three professional 
seasons, the player must pass through a waiver process 
in order to move between the major and minor leagues, 
giving other major league teams the opportunity to claim 
his rights (Major League Rule 10(e)). Furthermore, the 
Rule 5 Draft (Major League Rule 5) permits major league 
teams the ability to select any player not retained on 
another major league team’s forty-man roster, provided 
the selecting team keeps the player on its major league 
roster for the entire season.
These allowances provide little mobility to the 
minor league player. If they give assurance that the 
player’s service to a particular major league franchise 
will not continue indefinitely in the minor leagues, they 
barely meet this standard. By the time a player is free 
from the restrictions of the reserve system, much of his 
career has already passed. A player who has languished 
in the minor leagues for this length of time is very likely 
to become nothing more than a journeyman or a career 
minor leaguer. This is because most baseball executives 
stop considering a player a “prospect” around the age 
of 24, and studies have shown that the average player 
typically reaches his peak production at the age of 26 
or 27. Many players enter the minor leagues at the age 
of 18, but an approximately equal number of players 
are drafted at the ages of 20, 21, or 22. Indeed, a player 
who has stayed in the minor leagues long enough to be 
free from the reserve system will almost certainly never 
become an established major leaguer.
The Minor Leagues without 
an Antitrust Exemption
No attempt has ever been made to challenge the minor 
league reserve system, but it is widely believed that the 
courts would follow the same logic that led them to 
reject players’ pleas in Toolson and Flood (Szuchman, 
1996, p. 279). However, imagining for a moment that 
the exemption were overturned and baseball’s reserve 
system were found to be in violation of federal antitrust 
law, one can examine the effect that such an action might 
have on Minor League Baseball, which has always been 
the most persistent lobby against any legislative attempts 
to remove baseball’s antitrust exemption (Roberts, 1999, 
p. 413).
It is no secret that minor league player salaries are 
artificially depressed by baseball’s rigid salary structure. 
The salaries are set by Major League Baseball, with no 
input from the players or their agents. Logically, MLB 
would not create a salary structure that would award 
players more than their worth. Therefore, the only 
conceivable possibilities are that salaries are appropriate, 
or that they are depressed. However, with no reason 
given for the current salary schedule other than the 
general economic welfare of MLB, the idea that these 
figures are suitable is farfetched. Soon after the major 
league reserve system was abolished, salaries ballooned. 
There is no reason to expect any other potential result 
in the minor leagues. In fact, market forces imply that 
increases in compensation would be inevitable in a 
system of minor league free agency.
Baseball executives generally admit that minor 
league baseball players are underpaid. However, they 
argue, the players are working for the potential reward of 
one day earning a major league salary (Stein Interview). 
As such, their jobs are highly desirable. Furthermore, 
almost every player receives a bonus the first time he 
signs his contract. Most of these bonuses are relatively 
small ($25,000-50,000), but a few of them are valued in 
the millions. The first pick of the 2006 First-Year Player 
Draft received a $3.5 million bonus (“K.C.”). Still, the 
fact remains that the vast majority of minor leaguers 
never make it to the major leagues, and are left with next 
to nothing in return for their time and effort.
If salaries are artificially low, baseball claims, it 
is because they have to be in order for the teams to 
employ such a large volume of players. It is difficult to 
determine the exact number of players used by Minor 
League Baseball, because the number always fluctuates 
greatly during the season due to the First-Year Player 
Draft in June. However, a reasonable estimate puts the 
number in the thousands. While the actual number 
of players might be relatively unknown, it is easy to 
understand the ramifications if the reserve clause were 
lifted. Baseball already evaluates its expenditures on 
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the minor leagues to be in the hundreds of millions of 
dollars (Szuchman, 1996, p. 286). Allowing salaries to 
increase exponentially, the bill would quickly become 
too expensive to justify payment. It is no coincidence 
that none of the other major sports leagues in the 
United States have minor leagues that come close to 
rivaling baseball’s level of depth. The National Hockey 
League has two minor leagues (the American Hockey 
League and the East Coast Hockey League), while the 
National Basketball Association has a sole minor league, 
the National Basketball Developmental League. The 
National Football League does not have a minor league 
in the United States.
It is nearly certain that if the antitrust exemption 
were to be revoked, fewer players would be employed 
by Minor League Baseball. Without the ability to pay 
the players, the major league franchises would end 
their player development contracts with many of the 
minor league teams. Running on meager budgets, the 
newly abandoned minor league teams would not have 
the ability to pay player salaries, either. The degree of 
reduction in the number of affiliated players and teams 
would depend on what the major league franchises 
could afford, which would in turn depend on the extent 
to which salaries in the minor leagues increased. Minor 
League Baseball as we know it would be changed 
forever, and potentially eliminated.
Assuming a small increase in player salaries that 
could be managed by the major league clubs, free 
agency in the minor leagues would present still another 
problem. Obviously, along with free agency would come 
the ability for minor league players to change teams. 
As mentioned above, the major league clubs already 
invest a large amount of money in player development. 
Introducing the potential for players to “jump ship” 
after spending years in one club’s system would 
further discourage franchises from making such a large 
investment in player development (Stein Interview).
Some teams might revert to the independent minor 
league system that existed before Branch Rickey created 
the modern “farm system” in the 1930s. The independent 
leagues still exist today, on a much smaller scale. Major 
League Baseball would probably attempt to retain a 
small portion of the current minor league system by 
purchasing franchises in order to internalize the minor 
leagues and give them the protections associated with 
the labor exemption, but with the increased salaries, 
maintaining more than one team might not be possible. 
All MLB teams currently carry a 40-man roster, but 
only 25 players can be active major league players at 
one time. The remaining 15 players are held on minor 
league franchises, and the clubs could probably find the 
funds to pay these players, even in an inflated salary 
environment. In a predominately independent minor 
league system, players would play on low-budget teams 
for salaries at rates of pay likely commensurate with 
what they are paid in the minor leagues today, hoping 
to be noticed by a big league team. Top performers in 
the independent leagues would be signed by the major 
leagues and put directly onto team rosters. Most high 
school players would probably opt for college instead of 
the independent leagues, with few having the ability to 
leap straight to the major leagues. With Major League 
Baseball searching for methods to develop players, not 
only would the college ranks become a chief breeding 
ground for major league talent, but the international 
leagues would also play an increased role (Brand and 
Giorgione, 2003, p. 59).
Will Minor League Baseball Lose its 
Exemption?
Luckily for Minor League Baseball, there is little chance 
of a court ever ending its reserve system. Unwilling to 
overturn past precedent, the Supreme Court went so 
far in Toolson and Flood as to ask Congress for help in 
correcting the exemption. However, the Flood decision 
narrowly fell in management’s favor. If one Justice who 
had joined in the majority opinion had switched to the 
opposite side, the Flood Court would have reached a 4-4 
split. With such a tenuous grasp of the majority, it makes 
sense to think about the ramifications if the minor league 
system were evaluated under the rule of reason.
Minor League Baseball is a half-billion dollar a 
year industry. Nearly forty million people attend games 
annually (“History”). It is safe to say that the minor 
leagues are a staple of American culture. As such, it is 
clear that the minor leagues have merit as an institution 
and, hence, should be evaluated with care. The minor 
leagues would argue that the pro-competitive benefits of 
the reserve system outweigh any anti-competitive effects. 
In fact, the idea that the minor leagues could not exist as 
they currently do without the reserve system would be 
one of the league’s strongest arguments. However, if the 
minor leagues were to adopt this argument, they would 
still be required to adopt the least restrictive means of 
maintaining the aforementioned pro-competitive benefits 
(Spander, 1995, p. 113).
Another potential argument would be that the 
minor leagues operate as a single entity, with the goal 
of producing major league players. Unlike the major 
leagues, winning a championship is often a secondary 
goal for minor league franchises. Indeed, the games 
often take on a side-show quality at the lower levels. 
Allowing the single-entity defense would remove the 
minor leagues from consideration under Section One of 
the Sherman Act, because a single firm cannot commit 
an antitrust violation against itself. This defense has not 
always worked well for other sports leagues (726 F.2d 
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1381), but the Supreme Court has never ruled definitively 
on whether sports leagues should be treated as single 
entities. Also, MiLB is different from other leagues that 
have attempted the single-entity defense because of its 
role in the larger industry of professional baseball.
Additionally, the minor leagues might argue that 
the graduated pay scale negotiated into the MLUPC 
provides rewards for increased performance and 
simulates market conditions. Also, variations in signing 
bonuses offered to players creates salary dispersion, 
indicating competition. However, the Major League 
Rules specifically forbid monetary bonuses associated 
with improved performance (Major League Rule 3(b) 
(5)), so it would appear that if baseball is attempting 
to simulate a market, it does not wish to do so very 
accurately. The signing bonuses certainly provide some 
dispersion of minor league compensation, but a player 
loses all of his power of negotiation the moment he 
signs a MLUPC. If a player finds that his ability has 
improved after signing a contract, his only recourse is 
to hope to make the major leagues in order to receive 
commensurate pay. Again, there are certainly less 
restrictive options available.
Finally, there is potential for a convincing argument 
in the arena of consumer welfare. MiLB might argue that 
restraints on player salaries keep ticket prices down, 
therefore benefiting consumers, one of the main groups 
that the antitrust laws are designed to protect. The minor 
leagues are making money right now, but in order to 
maintain profitability in an era of minor league free 
agency, one of the first approaches most teams would 
be forced to attempt would be a ticket price hike. The 
Supreme Court has not yet heard this argument, either, 
so it has interesting potential as a defense.
Of course, allowing these arguments to be heard 
before the court does not indicate that they will succeed. 
The players would need only to continue the discussion 
that Curt Flood started in order to make a reasonable 
beginning to a case for the reserve system’s abolition. No 
precedent exists to confirm or deny that a player would 
succeed in bringing suit against baseball. This situation 
is unique in that the player would not belong to a union; 
hence, the statutory and nonstatutory labor exemptions 
would not come into play as they have in other cases. For 
example, in Brown v. Pro Football (1996), the Supreme 
Court ruled that because practice squad salaries had been 
collectively bargained, they were exempt from antitrust 
law. This is a typical decision in the realm of player 
challenges to management implemented conditions. At 
least one legal scholar has already made an argument 
that restraints in the minor leagues violate Section One 
of the Sherman Act (Spander, 1995, p. 129).
If MiLB were to lose its exemption, and the courts 
subsequently deemed the minor leagues to be in violation 
of the laws to which it had been newly subjected, where 
then would MiLB turn? To the people who make the 
laws, of course. With franchises in about 40 percent of 
Congressional districts, Minor League Baseball has an 
exceptionally well-oiled lobby. In 1998, MiLB successfully 
lobbied to change the Curt Flood Act to explicitly state 
that it would have no effect on the antitrust laws’ effect 
on the minor leagues. The Curt Flood Act was mostly 
a political move made in the wake of the 1994 baseball 
strike to help foster a better relationship between MLB 
and the MLBPA. Written into the CBA that was ratified 
in December, 1996, was Article 28, a single paragraph 
that stated that MLB and the MLBPA would work 
together to make major league labor negotiations subject 
to federal antitrust law (2007-2011 Basic Agreement, 
Article XXVIII). When legislators eagerly adopted this 
opportunity for political point-scoring, they were met 
with fierce opposition from MiLB, which had a laundry 
list of concerns with the bill. In the end, MiLB was able to 
have all of its concerns addressed (Roberts, 1999, p. 437). 
This success indicates that legislators consider the minor 
league lobby to be an important one, and signifies that 
future successes might be obtained. The sheer number 
of fans who would be unhappily disenfranchised in the 
event of a minor league collapse under the weight of 
federal antitrust law would be reason enough for federal 
legislators to become involved.
Lastly, one quite obvious possibility has been 
overlooked during almost this entire discussion. What if 
the minor league players were to unionize? It worked for 
the major leaguers, as the MLBPA has expanded rights, 
freedoms, and salaries for MLB players since it began 
to flex its muscle in the 1970s. There is no question of 
the minor league players’ legal ability to create a union 
(Szuchman, 1996, p. 297). Of course, the union would 
begin slowly, seeking few concessions in the beginning. 
Eventually, however, players would request salary hikes. 
A minor league union would not have the leverage that 
the MLBPA possesses — players in the minor leagues 
make less money; are more easily replaceable; and are 
more desperate to work, because good performance in 
the minors is a minor league player’s only viable route to 
the major leagues. Still, MLB would be forced to bargain 
with the players under the NLRA. While the players 
might not gain free agency, salaries would eventually 
rise. Many of the same outcomes discussed above would 
likely occur as a result of the increased costs. With major 
league teams already eating into some of the profits 
of their minor league clubs by asking for a larger and 
larger percentage of ticket revenue, increased salaries 
for players would put an even tighter squeeze on minor 
league ownership (Stein Interview). While the presence 
of a union might not have the drastic effects on MiLB that 
a change in federal antitrust law would, the unionization 
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of minor league players would undoubtedly have visible 
effects on the game.
Conclusion
Minor League Baseball relies heavily on the antitrust 
protection it has enjoyed since the dawn of its existence. 
It has developed with an understanding that the rules 
do not apply to it in the same way that they do to 
other leagues and businesses. While not necessarily 
devastating, destroying one of the cornerstones of this 
industry’s foundation would create a tremor that would 
be felt by citizens in every corner of the United States. 
Our system of laws and lawmaking makes the possibility 
of such an event somewhat remote, but as long as there 
are people behind these laws and their interpretation, 
anything is possible. There is no doubt that Minor 
League Baseball will maintain a vigilant eye with the 
goal of protecting its share of our national pastime.
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